The market power analysis in electricity market is relevant for understanding the competitive development of the industry's restructuring and the liberalization process. The paper analyzes the market power exercised by power generators in the Italian wholesale electricity market. Following the approach of Wolak (2003, 2009), the extent of market power is measured using the Lerner index computed as the inverse of arc elasticity of the residual demand faced by each Cournot competitors.
INTRODUCTION
The worldwide wave of power system restructuring led in Italy to the Electricity Market (IPEX) which started in April of 2004 and on 1st January 2005, the market was opened to full demand-side participation. Electricity Market has become a physical pool market where hourly blocks of electricity are traded. In Italy, the IPEX has been organized as a day-ahead market (MGP), intra-day market (MI) and ancillary service market (MSD), similar to other countries 1 .
The main factors designing the structure and the degree of efficiency in the electricity market are essentially two: a technical factor, given by transmission capacity of the power grid, and an economic factor, given by the degree of market competition.
Nevertheless, the Italian electricity market, as reported by Bigerna et al. (2015) , recorded transmission congestions and its structure is far from being perfectly competitive: suppliers are able to exercise market power bidding prices higher than their marginal costs (see Bosco et al., 2012) .
In this work we use hourly data of the Day-Ahead-Market for 2013 and 2014 and simulate the hourly market equilibrium prices in a virtual competitive market where operators' market power had been removed. The aim is finding how much the theoretical competitive prices are far from the actual recorded market clearing price.
In the new open-market context the typical activities (generation, transmission and distribution of electricity) of this system have been carried out by separate entities.
Electricity generation became a liberalized activity while transmission has been preserved as a regulated activity given that electricity is an instantaneous commodity that is expensive to store. Therefore, currently electricity generation must match the demand at each instant, responding to seasonal patterns and instantaneous 1 The MGP is a wholesale electricity market, where hourly blocks of electricity are negotiated for the next day and where prices, volumes. injection and withdrawal schedules are defined for the next day. This is a non-compulsory pool administrated by a market operator, in Italian Gestore del Mercato Elettrico (GME). The MI market enable participants to update their demand bids and supply offers, as well as their commercial positions, with a frequency similar to the one of continuous trading, taking into account variations of power plants and consumption requirements. MSD is the market where Terna -as Transmission System Operator -procures the resources needed to manage, operate, monitor and control the power system (relief of intra-zonal congestions, creation of energy reserve, real-time balancing. fluctuations. In order to satisfy this fluctuating demand, electric utilities are forced to maintain different generation assets (Muratori et al. 2014) . Base-load electricity is provided by extremely reliable, efficient power plants (such as plants hydroelectric and coal power plants), which take a long time to start up and are designed to work at their nominal capacity with a small degree of flexibility. On the other hand, peak power plants run only when there is a high demand for electricity, they can be started up quickly and are flexible enough to match rapid fluctuations in the demand. Peak plants are less efficient (compared to base-load power plants) due to the high cost of the underutilization results in significant maintenance and capital recovery costs.
The high complexity of the power system and the need of instantaneously coordination between the injection and withdrawal programs made imperative to identify a central coordinating entity, in charge of monitoring and guaranteeing the continuity and quality of the service under maximum security conditions. This center (Transmission System Operator) ensures that generation matches consumption at any time and that frequency and voltage do not deviate from the transmission limits on the grids and the dynamic constraints on power plants. For security management reasons, TSO divided the national grid into zones and the configuration of these zones depends on how the electricity flows are managed along the peninsula 2 .
The structure of electricity market reflects the transmission constraints, as it is divided into portions of transmission grids (zones) where there are physical limits to transmission of electricity to/from the corresponding neighboring zones.
The day-ahead market is based on an implicit-auction model and hosts most of the transactions of purchase and sale of electricity. Participants may submit bids/offers where they specify the volume and the maximum/minimum price at which they are willing to purchase/sell in each hour of the day. 2 These zones may be summarized as follows: -6 geographical zones (central-northern Italy, northern, central-southern Italy, southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia); -8 neighboring countries' virtual zones (France, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, BSP, Corsica, Corsica AC and Greece); -4 national virtual zones representing constrained zones, i.e. zones consisting only of generating units, whose interconnection capacity with the grid is lower than their installed capacity.
TSO schedules the withdrawal and injection programs ranking the bids and the offers under the economic merit-order criterion given the transmission limits between zones. The ordered offers are then aggregated to form the hourly market supply and demand curves and the intersection between them determine the clearing price and the volume traded.
If the flows on the grid resulting from the schedules do not violate any transmission limit, the clearing price is a single one in all the zones and equal to P*. Accepted offers are those having a selling price not higher than P* and accepted bids are those having a purchasing price not lower than P*.
If at least one limit is violated, the national market is split in two zones:
 one exporting zone, including all the zones upstream of the constraint, and  one importing zone, including all the zones downstream of the constraint.
 all accepted supply offers are valued at the clearing price of the zone to which they belong. This price is determined, for each hour, by the intersection between the demand curve and the supply curve and is different from one zone to the other when transmission limits are saturated;
 the accepted demand bids pertaining to withdrawal points belonging to geographical zones are valued at the national single price (Prezzo Unico Nazionale: PUN), which is equal to the average of zonal prices weighted for zonal consumption.
If additional transmission limits within each market zone are violated, the market splitting process is repeated also within this zone until obtaining a result consistent with grid constraints. The above described market splitting mechanism represents a non-discriminatory implicit auction for the assignment of transmission rights.
Given the restructuring process involving the electricity industry, the analysis of market power (that occurs when a firm is able to affect prices because of concentration in a single step of the supply chain) has become a central issue to understand the effectiveness of the liberalization process. The exercise of market power has important implications in terms of efficiency, as described by Borenstein et al (2002) . In the short-run, for example, if a supplier exercising market power restricts its output in order to raise prices, productive efficiency can be compromised by smaller players expanding generation from more expensive plants in response to the higher prices. In the medium and in the long-run, when demand is more elastic, market power may have an impact on the level of consumption and creates allocative inefficiencies. In particular, the marginal value of the next unit of consumption will be in excess of the marginal cost of some units of withheld supply. Market power can increase the level of congestion on a network, thereby affecting efficiency and reliability of the system (Cardel et al., 1997) . Finally, market power can influence longterm decisions: an increase in power prices should ideally be interpreted as a signal for investors that new capacity is needed, but this may not be the case if market power is being exercised (dynamic inefficiency). This paper is organized as follow: section 2 describes the frequencies of market segmentation and the main configuration when Italy is split in two market. In third section the theoretical model underlying the measurement of market power is explained while in Section 4 shows and discusses the Lerner indexes of the main suppliers, (representing their market power) the volumes and the equilibrium prices that would occur if IPEX market was perfectly competitive while in Section 5 the main conclusions are derived.
DATA
production to the importing zones, as they can not violate the transmission constraints. In order to get rid of the effects of transmission constraints from the equilibrium market, we constructed a new supply curve where the offers are ordered according to the increasing price, while the demand curve is constructed aggregating the bids in a decreasing order price.
The volumes and the clearing prices derived from the intersection of the two curves represent the market equilibrium purged of the effect of congestions. This procedure has been executed for all the hours in which national market has been split in two zones (roughly the 60% of the hours).
With this method the efficient plants (belonging to the exporting zone) having effective marginal costs that actually were rejected from the grid, are reinserted in order to form the new supply curve. Offers pertaining exporting zone with price lower than PUN are reinserted while offers related to the import zone with price higher than PUN are excluded from the new order.
Given the hourly new supply curves, where the rank depends just on the economic merit order, we computed the residual demand faced by the companies of interest.
The chosen firms differ in market share. Enel, the former stated-owned monopolist, had a market close to 18% (both, in 2013 and 2014) . GSE, the state-owned company promoting renewable energy sources (RES) in Italy, held similar shares and in 2013 GSE reported the higher share (near to 19%) that is ascribable to the fact that GSE resells electricity generated by renewable-energy sources which dispatching priority is recognized to. Then, all the GSE's bids can be deemed as offers with price equal zero and, given their economic merit order, the GSE's bids are always accepted in the injection schedules.
The remaining firms whose the Lerner index was computed are A2A, Edison, Eni, Gdf Suez and Sorgenia. Although the Eni's share would lead to deem that company operate as a price-taker firm, its history and its degree of integration across the energy industry activities, legitimate the choice to include Eni in the analysis of market power.
THEORETICAL MODEL
Different methodologies have been proposed to measure market power: these include concentration measures, the competitive benchmark approach and the NEIO approach, models of optimizing behavior and direct measures of unilateral market power.
The first approach to measuring market power focuses on observable dimensions of the industry structure such as market shares and related indices like the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 6 . This is given by the sum of squares of the market shares of the firms in an industry. However, this concentration measure is considered inappropriate to assess the level of market power in the electricity industry because it
ignores key factors such as demand elasticity, transmission constraints, forward contracts and the inter-temporal variation in the exercise of market power. The largest suppliers may in fact exercise market power by withholding production once competitive firms had reached their full output generation capacity. As a result, the concentration of the market and the HHI index would reduce as the main firm was decreasing its market shares by withholding production, but the resulting equilibrium market-clearing price would raise above its competitive levels 7 .
An alternative way to measure market power is based on the comparison between the actual prices and the simulated competitive benchmark price. This approach relies on simulation models to derive the competitive benchmark and provides an ex post measure of the mark-up. The comparison is often made through the Lerner index (LI):
(1)
The index would be close to zero in competitive markets and to one if significant market power is exercised 8 . 6 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) ranges from zero (representing a perfect competitive market) to one (pertaining a monopolist market).
The weakness of this approach is that inaccurate simulation models could produce erroneous estimates of marginal costs and competitive prices by ignoring commitment costs, ramping/must-run/transmission constraints and reliability.
In the 1980 the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) developed a new empirical approach to measure market power (Bresnahan, 1989) . The empirical models developed of NEIO literature estimate the level of market power exercised in an industry exploiting both the information given by empirical data (market-clearing prices and quantities) and the theoretical assumptions concerning the functional form of demand and cost curves, the type of strategic interaction among firms and on their expected profit maximizing behavior. Despite the great number of applications these models have the problem that their estimates of market power crucially depend on the assumption of the strategic interaction among firms and on the assumed functional form of demand and cost curves 9 .
If bids of the wholesale markets are available, a more direct approach is the optimizing behavior model that makes possible deriving a measure of market power in electricity markets without assuming the specific functional form for the demand and the marginal cost curve. The relationship between price and quantity bid by each firm is analyzed through the response of all the other competitors. Supporting for this interpretation is provided by market rules in Italy, which do not restrict the ability of operators to submit bids. Accordingly, suppliers and purchaser can submit bids any time before market closure and revise bids freely for the entire daily span as many times as they deem necessary to adjust their injection and withdrawal programs.
Model of optimizing behavior
We assume that the model underlying the electricity market is an oligopolistic Cournot model: for any period h , firm chooses the bidding strategy maximizing its profit function, given the bids submitted by all other competitors 10 .
On the supply side the profit function faced by a generator is defined as:
RD p is the residual demand faced by the generator i in period h , while () ii MC q is the marginal cost of output level i q and i F is the fixed costs 11 .
Assuming the generator acts unilaterally given the bids placed by other competitors, in any load period his goal is to find the quantity i q that maximizes the profit. The best response bidding quantity is given by the output level at which the marginal revenue associated with that period's residual demand equals the firm's short-run marginal cost. 12
Regardless of the actual residual demand realization in a given hour, a generator maximizing profits unilaterally would face the following first order condition: (2015) and Wolak (2000) proposed a variation of profit function that entails for each period i the forward contract quantity and their corresponding price held by generator. 12 Wolak estimates a model of best-response bidding to recover the marginal cost function of the largest Australian power generator.
formula can be used to estimates an empirical "Lerner index" and the firm's unilateral incentive to exercise unilateral market power.
Since the empirical residual demand is a step function, computing its elasticity at a given point requires a finite difference approach; we use the arc elasticity whose inverse can be consider the empirical Lerner Index: Following Wolak (2003) we compute the Lerner index as the inverse of residual demand elasticity for each suppliers of interest.
The competitive Fringe
We have implemented the standard Cournot model introducing a variant: the competitive fringe. In the both side of market (demand and supply) firms were divided into two categories: operators with small market share that it seems could not credibly attempt to affect the market price are treated as price-takers and they represent the competitive fringe price takers. On the other hand, larger firms are deemed to behave strategically. Generators that operate under inflexible, non-market based agreements are also treated as price-taking and added into the competitive fringe. Larger deregulated generators that it appeared could affect the market price under some conditions were assumed to follow Cournot strategies.
We start constructing the supply and the demand step function. Given the sample distribution of the recorded prices, we recover 30 quantiles (which divide the price observations in 30 group of the same size) and we use them as the break point for the supply and the demand step function.
Secondly, we control for the effect of the fringe by subtracting the aggregate supply of these firms from the market demand at any given market price. Then, we subtract from the market demand the quantity supplied by the fringe firms at every price and the resulting curve is the net demand faced by Cournot price-maker players.
Formally, the resulting demand curve faced by Cournot players can be written as:
Dp is the market demand function, f S represents the fringe supply curve and h is the index used for denoting the hour of the day which the offers refers to.
Finally, we construct the residual demand curves for the Cournot players given the assumption that, at the Cournot equilibrium, each firm is producing its profitmaximizing quantity given the quantities that are being produced by all other Cournot participants.
For each competitors we construct its supply curve by horizontally summing the hourly single offers (ranked in a non-decreasing price order), then we derive the residual demand for competitor i using the following formula:
where * () hh Dp is the net demand defined in (5) Then we compute the Lerner Index for each operator for the price interval corresponding to the quantile where the market clearing price lies using the formula (4) of the arc elasticity.
RESULTS
Lerner indexes are computed for all the times in which single or two-market segmentation occurred; the aggregated values of estimates are averaged accordingly two main aggregation criteria: the quantile of the price distribution and the hours of the day. Tab.9-Tab.25 show for the main suppliers their average Lerner index aggregated by the quantiles of the market clearing price and the hours of the day. The Lerner indexes derived using eq. (3) shows clearly the suppliers exercised different degree of market power; When single market occurred GSE reported the lowest values, equal to 3.27% in the fourth quarter of 2013 while ENEL recorded the highest (equal to 35.92%) during the first semester of 2013. ENEL, the former monopolist, shows a sizable market power when there is not congestion but the extent of its Lerner index decreased over the period considered.
It needs to highlight that GSE's Lerner index has not been computed for the third quarter of 2013 and the whole 2014. It means that, given the dispatching priority recognized to renewable plants, TSO assumed that all GSE's bids have price equal to zero corresponding to a price-taker behavior.
Lerner indexes computed for each strategic suppliers were than aggregated between peak and off-peak hours. Not surprisingly, the indexes are higher during off-peak periods, when the electricity demand is more inelastic and wholesaler purchasers are not able to change their withdrawal programs necessary to run their production activities.
Moreover, during off-peak hours, the number of generators is lower and renewable plants, as photovoltaic plants, cannot generate electricity, reducing the degree of competition in the market.
It is significant to notice that the computed market power was higher when market was divided in two zones. It reveals that when maximum simultaneous competition was possible, that is when there was no congestion and the market was not split in two zones, competition forces worked to make other operators become more aggressive 13 . Moreover, congestions during peak hours may suggest that electricity is an essential commodity whose demand is stiff and whose consumption cannot be postponed.
Following Cramton's approach (Cramton, 2004) , the prices bid by the strategic firms were then adjusted using the estimates of their Lerner indexes (differing in the referring operator, quarter of the years and levels of price). The new prices are computed using the following formula:
Where i represents the operator, h represent the hour, while k refers to the quantile in which the price bid lies.
The formula allows to depurate the prices from the effect of market power shifting the supply down. Moreover, given different Lerner indexes, the adjusted prices change the economic merit order of suppliers: having changed the price bid by the suppliers, the new supply curves are constructed summing the offers in a nondecreasing price order different from the previous merit order.
Then, we cross the new supply curves with the demand in order to find the new market-clearing price for each hours of the 2013 and 2014. The difference between the old and the new marginal price are reported in Tab.28-Tab.31.
The differential is remarkable and, accordingly with the estimates of Lerner index, higher during off-peak hours. In the fourth quarter of 2014, for instance, at 0 a.m. this differential reached the 84%: starting from an average market-clearing price of 47 euro, if market became perfectly competitive, the new clearing price would be approximately near to 26 euro. The graphs below show some examples of market resolutions and compare the old equilibrium with the new one, where the market supply curve shifted down by the effect of Lerner index. The comparison has been performed for all the quarters of 2013 and 2014 and focused on two hours of the day (2 a.m. and 2 p.m.), one referring to peak period and the other concerning the off-peak one.
Graphs highlight how the adjusting the market from the effect of market power results in lower equilibrium price given the shifting of supply curve. As the elasticity of market demand is not significant, the new market resolution do not involve an increase in the volumes traded.
In this paper the price differential was computed only for the hours when single market occurred, since the effects of congestion on the demand side has not been investigated and deserved to be analyzed in further researches.
CONCLUSION
This paper addressed the issue of computing a virtual competitive market equilibrium in the Italian wholesale electricity market for the 2013 and the 2014 using the hourly data provided by GME. Lerner index was taken as a measure of the market power exercised by the main suppliers, taking into account the effect of congestion, to compute the competitive virtual bidding behavior of the main market operators.
The results of the Lerner index computation clearly show that firms exercised different market power and ENEL, the former state-owned monopolist, reported the higher index. Moreover, market power is higher when transmission constraints are not violated and during the off-peak hours, when the number of generators is lower and consumers' demand is more inelastic since electricity is an essential commodity whose consumption can not be postponed.
The Lerner indexes were then used to adjust the prices bid by the strategic 
